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ABSTRACT. There have been few attempts to empirically explain the pursuit of
short term relationships and sex in a formal context. Previous work has lamented
the paucity of empirical studies which utilize incentive driven behavior to draw
conclusions and recommend policy. We develop a model of social network for-
mation through sexual matching, provide an empirical approach derived from the
model and apply it to a population of high interest. Specifically, we apply the ap-
proach to a population of sexually active men who have sex with men (MSM) in
a large metropolitan area and derive qualitative conclusions regarding how indi-
viduals behave in the marketplace for sex.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“Sex without love is an empty experience, but as empty experiences go,
its one of the best.”
- Woody Allen
We develop a model of social interaction between self-interested agents in what
can be termed as the “sexual marketplace.” (Laumann, 2004) In particular, we in-
vestigate patterns of sexual matches between men who have sex with men (MSM).
MSM engage in multiple short term relationships, the pursuit of which can be con-
sidered as repeated play of one shot matching games among similarly motivated
agents. The concept of such “sex marketplaces” has been primarily pursued in a
sociological or epidemiological context (Laumann, 1994; Laumann and Michael,
2001; Laumann, 2004). Little work has been done in economics to model sexual
behavior for its own sake1. In fact, Phillipson, et al. (1994) claim that AIDS policy
is ineffective due to the fact that policy does not take into account how individual
behavior responds to incentives (Philipson, Posner, and Wright, 1994). Although
more recent work has taken this issue to task, to our knowledge little work has
been done in a game theoretic context that emphasizes probabilistic short term
sexual behavior2 (Kremer, 1996). The work closest to our approach is a model in-
volving individual choice with regard to HIV testing(Caplin and Eliaz, 2003). Our
emphasis is to model sexual partner choice and consequent outcomes.
Due to the high frequency of short term relationships that MSM often engage
in, patterns of frequency across individuals are more stark than in heterosexual
relationships. MSM are thus a population well suited to study the determinants
of sexualmatching in comparison to matching that very often results in long term
relationships. To put it bluntly,
”Women need a reason to have sex. Men just need a place.”
- Billy Crystal
Modelling the dynamics of the sex market can help predict the frequency and
distribution of sexual partners which occur as outcomes of the sex market. Such
dynamics therefore have sociological and epidemiological implications. We ask
the following questions:
(1) Based on observable characteristics, which partners will an individual pur-
sue? In other words, how do people choose sexual partners under the re-
source constraint of the pool of prospective partners?
(2) Given empirical characteristics (e.g. physical appearance), in what ways
do we observe agents trading off between the attractiveness of partners
and the possibility of remaining single? Specifically, do real world rela-
tionships cluster around similar characteristics (is the sex market assorta-
tive)?
1One notable exception is Mialon (2003) (Mialon, 2003).
2Outside of economics, some recent work has incorporated probabilistic methods into Gale and Shap-
ley’s classic model(Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005).
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In regard to the first question, we provide a formal model which allows for mul-
tiple optimal behaviors, ranging from agents trying to date only the most attrac-
tive members of the population to “playing it safe” and only dating those most
similar in attractiveness to themselves. In regard to the second question, we use
our model along with data on sexual behavior to estimate a key model parameter
which gives a qualitative explanation to how the sex market functions. We find
that the sex market is fairly assortative and estimate how often and under what
conditions it is assortative. In doing so, we resolve two competing claims regard-
ing what drives behavior in the sex market, in the sense of empirically estimating
conditions under which each occurs.
This paper is organized as follows: A formal model with emphasis on exam-
ples is presented, along with a few key results which drive the model. Next is a
specification of the statistical test following from the model and a description and
discussion of the data used. Then results are presented and interpreted in model
context, followed by a discussion of two competing claims and areas for further
work. Finally, a detailed appendix3 provides further model examples and results
for the interested reader.
2. MODEL SYNOPSIS
In AgentLand there is a population P full of lonely agents with different at-
tractiveness types θi > 0. Agents can end their loneliness by matching with each
other, and agent i receives a utility u(θ) from matching with type θ4. Thus, when
two types θi and θj match with one another, agent i receives a payoff of u(θj),
and agent j receives a payoff of u(θi). “Self matching” is not allowed. In keeping
with θ being a measure of attractiveness, we assume that u is strictly increasing in
θ. Accordingly, everyone would like to match with the highest type possible. By
convention we label the types θi in increasing order, i.e. θ1 < θ2 < . . .. At the end
of the game, an agent imay remain lonely (unmatched) in which case we say they
are matched to the “null agent” θ0 = 0 and receive a payoff of u(θ0) = 0. Notice
this assumes that “any match is better than no match,” an assumption most suited
to short term rather than long term behavior5.
Unfortunately for the lonely agents, in order to match, at night they must go to
one of the local bars in AgentLand, each of which can only hold N agents.
2.1. An evening at the AgentBar. Once a bar in AgentLand fills upwithN agents,
agents meet each other and each agent’s type θi becomes public knowledge. Dur-
ing the course of the evening, each agent imay proposition a different agent j, and
we agent i’s choice as Ai ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. Agents choose Ai to maximize expected
utility as developed below. When agent i propositions agent j, we call the propo-
sition a contact from i to j. Immediately before closing time, we can summarize
the various contacts across agents in the contact network depicted in Figure 1 for
N = 4.
3To be interpreted as “available upon request,” but included with this paper for completeness.
4Here we have assumed that all agents have the same preferences, but it may not be too difficult to find
data regarding preferences in sexual roles which have some explanatory power, see for instance (Yee,
2002).
5Recent research suggests that cues regarding short and long term intent are visually observable, e.g.
(Warner, 2006).
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FIGURE 1. A Contact Network.
Contacts are successful or unsuccessfulwith probabilities p and 1−p, respectively
and the success of a contact is not known to any agent until the bar closes. In other
words, p is a “noise parameter” determining the success or failure of any partic-
ular proposal to match and the closer p is to one, the more likely any particular
proposal is successful. In this paper we take p as exogeneously given for two rea-
sons. First, we will in fact estimate p for a particular population below and our
dataset is not sufficiently rich to reasonably estimate an endogeneous p. Second,
by considering p as exogeneous for particular venues we can predict different be-
haviors in different venues. For example we might consider internet dating with
a high p (multiple body photographs, sober individuals, detailed conversations)
versus the “darkrooms” found in gay bars with low p (dim lights to hide charac-
teristics, alcohol and drug use, very little conversation).
2.2. Closing time. At closing time, agents have exhausted all of their strategic ac-
tions and nature takes its course. First, unsuccessful contacts are removed from
the contact network. Second, starting with the highest type agent, that agent
is awarded a match with their highest successful contact (if one exists) and the
matched pair is removed from the network. Third, the second stage is repeated
for the next highest type agent remaining in the network. This process is formal-
ized in Algorithm 1. We summarize all steps of the game in Figure 2.
2.3. Beliefs and Equilibrium. Above we have specified how matches occur for
any particular contacts Ai that agents choose, as well as the payoffs obtained by
matching (or remaining unmatched). In order to close the model, we need to spec-
ify how agents chooseAi. First, we assume that agent i has subjective beliefs µi re-
garding the choices of all agents. Since each agent choosesAi ∈ {1, . . . N}, we may
define a belief µi as a probability density over ×Ni=1Ai = {1, . . . , N}N . Since each
vector in ×Ni=1Ai is nothing but the list of contacts made by agents and each such
vector corresponds to a unique Contact Network, we may think of a belief µi as a
subjective probability density over Contact Networks. For simplicity we will only
consider beliefs which place probability one on a particular (A1, . . . AN ) ∈ ×Ni=1Ai.
A belief µi pairedwith a choiceAi generates expected utilityU(Ai, µi)whichwe
develop below. The appropriate equilbrium concept is choices A∗ ≡ (A∗1, . . . , A∗N )
and beliefs µ ≡ (µ1, . . . , µN ) such that choices are optimal given beliefs. Formally,
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FIGURE 2. Steps of the Game for N = 4, k = 1
Algorithm 1 Resolving the Contact Network.
(1) Make a graph with each vertex representing an agent which contains no
edges.
(2) Look at each agent’s choice Ai, and independently with probability p each
contact is represented as a directed edge going from the agent making the
contact to who they contact. For example, a total of k edges are drawnwith
probability
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k.
(3) Start with the highest numbered agent, say i, and find the edge which is
listed highest in their contact list, say E. Now one of three things can
happen:
(a) If the agent has no outgoing edges, they are free for subsequent
matches.
(b) If E has an outgoing edge to an unmatched agent j, i and j are
matched.
(c) If E has an outgoing edge to a matched agent j, agent i goes home
alone and is considered matched in evaluating subsequent agents.
(4) Repeat Step 3 until all agents have been evaluated.
(A∗, µ) constitute an equilibrium when for each agent iwe have
U(A∗i , µi) = max
j∈{1,...,N}
U(j, µi)
In order to pare down the number of equilibria in this game6 we propose the re-
finement of a Rational Expectations (RE) equilibrium, which requires that agents
beliefs match up with other agent’s chosen actions. Formally,
6Clearly we can have multiple equilibria from “crazy” beliefs. E.g. say the least attractive individual
believes everyone is contacting him which results in suboptimal behavior.
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Definition. (RE Equilibrium) An equilibrium (A∗, µ) is a Rational Expectations
equilibrium if and only if µi(A∗1, . . . , A∗N ) = 1 for each agent i.
It is shown below that a Rational Expectations equilbrium always exists. Here-
after we consider only RE equilibria.
2.4. Expected Payoffs. Having specified the action Ai open to each agent and his
beliefs µi, we can define the agent’s expected payoff for each such pair (Ai, µi).
From each agent’s perspective, every pair (Ai, µi) induces an N by N matrix
C(Ai, µi) which contains the probabilities of various agents matching at closing
time. Specifically, C(Ai, µi)j,k is the probability that agent j matches with agent k
as a result of j contacting k.
In order to make this concrete, refer to the Contact Network in Figure 1 with
agent types 1,2,3, and 4 so θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2, etc. Suppose that the agent with type
1 has beliefs which are consistent with the lines drawn and chooses A1 = 4, as in
the Figure. Then we have that (applying the clearing rule specified above)7
C(A1 = 4, µ1) =

0 0 0 p(1− p)3
0 0 0 p(1− p)2
0 0 0 p(1− p)
0 0 p 0

Still referring to Figure 1 suppose that the type 1 agent instead contacted agent
2. Then the probability of agent 1 matching with agent 2 resulting from agent 1
contacting agent 2 would be (again, recall the clearing rule):
Pr(contact from 1 to 2 successful)·Pr(2’s contact was unsuccessful and 2 is unmatched) = p·(1−p)
so that the new matrix is
C(A1 = 2, µ1) =

0 p(1− p) 0 0
0 0 0 p(1− p)2
0 0 0 p(1− p)
0 0 p 0

Now as far the agent is concerned, he only cares about the net probability of
matching with another agent and the type of that agent, regardless of who made
contact. Accordingly, if we defineM(Ai, µi) by
M(Ai, µi) ≡ C(Ai, µi) + C(Ai, µi)>
we arrive at a matrix which contains the net probability of i and j matching in its
(ith, jth) place. Finally, defining a vector of utilities u˜ by
u˜ ≡ (u(θ1), . . . , u(θN ))
we see that conditional on the actionAi and beliefs µi, the expected payoff to agent
i is the ith element of the vector u˜M(Ai, µi). We therefore define agent i’s expected
payoff as (where ei is the ith standard basis vector)
(1) U(Ai, µi) ≡ u˜M(Ai, µi)ei
7In examining the matrix, it helps to start with the bottom row.
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2.5. Model Examples. To illustrate the model more fully8, we present many dif-
ferent equilibrium outcomes for different values of p in Figure 3. Each box in the
Figure represents an agent of type θi = i and a directed edge from θi to θj indicates
that θi has chosen to contact θj , or rather Ai = j. Except at possibly the boundary
values of p, each equilibrium illustrated is unique for the range of p stated.
FIGURE 3. Specific Examples of Equilibria Across p.
(a) Four Agents (b) Six Agents
As above, each contact network induces a distribution of partners for each
agent, given byM(Ai, µi). Sincewe are assuming Rational Expectations,M(Ai, µi)
is the same for each agent i. For the six agent case above with p = .5 the relevant
distribution is
M(Ai, µi) =

0 0 0 0 .125 0
0 0 0 0 0 .125
0 0 0 .75 0 0
0 0 .75 0 0 0
.125 0 0 0 0 0.75
0 .125 0 0 0.75 0

For instance, M(Ai, µi)3,4 = .75 indicates that the probability of types 3 and 4
being matched is .75, which follows from the following calculations:
Agent i = 3 −→Agent i = 4:
Pr((3,4) Match from A3 contacting A4) = .5
Agent i = 4 −→Agent i = 3:
Pr((3,4) Match from A4 contacting A3|A4 is unmatched) Pr(A4 is unmatched) = .25
The raw probabilities of agents matching with anyone whatsoever are then
(where the ith place holds the match probability of agent i):
M(Ai, µi) · 1 =
[
.125 .125 .75 .75 .875 .875
]>
8Details illustrating the analytical calculations for the N = 4 case of Figure 3 can be found in the Sup-
plemental Appendix. The equilibria for the caseN = 6 have been numerically solved via a simulation
program.
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In this case the least desirable types θ1 and θ2 have traded the high probability
of being matched to one another in the slim hopes of being matched to higher
types. The lesson is that desirable agents will seldom go unmatched and should
therefore over time have more matches from a wider selection of agents. This sug-
gests for instance that the most desirable agents are important targets for effective
intervention in preventing Sexually Transmitted Infections.
3. MODEL IMPLICATIONS
In a model of sexual matching, common experience as well as intuition suggests
the following features should be observed:
(1) (Personal Standards) In equilibrium, a given attractiveness type should never
contact a type which is “below their standards,” although he might match
with slightly lower types when better options have been exhausted.
(2) (Reciprocity) When a higher type contacts a lower type, the lower type
should in some way reciprocate.
(3) (Chasing and Sorting)When the level of “noise” is high, all agents will take
a chance chasing the highest agent, andwhen noise is lowwill sort perfectly
in pairs consisting of similar levels of attractiveness.
In this Section we show how each of these behavioral observations are generated
by the model.
3.1. Personal Standards. Consider the most attractive agent in the game, agent
N . He is blessed by having a high type in that his choice AN is evaluated first at
closing time and therefore if successful he will be matched to agent AN . Since AN
thereby “trumps” all other agents, the optimal choice for agent N is AN = N − 1
since agent N − 1 is the most attractive of the other agents and therefore gives
the highest payoff. Using similar logic for agent N − 1, he might choose AN−1 =
N or N − 2 but will not choose AN−1 < N − 2 in equilibrium since it must be that
AN > N − 2 so that agent N − 1 “trumps” all agents but agent N . Proceeding
inductively, we conclude a formal result that says it is never optimal for an agent
to lower their standards to contacting anyone who is much less attractive than
themselves9.
Proposition 3.1. (Personal Standards) Let A∗i be agent i’s optimal choice in equilibrium.
Then
A∗i ≥ i− 1
In other words, an agent will never contact an agent who is more than one “level of attrac-
tiveness” below his own.
3.2. Reciprocity. Our result regarding Personal Standards underscores the fact
that optimal behavior takes into account both the contacts of other agents and
knowledge of the “pecking order” present in the sex market. Another salient pre-
diction of the model is the reciprocity exhibited by less attractive agents towards
more attractive agents. The proof is more complex and is therefore in the appen-
dix, but the rationale is as follows: When an attractive agent’s best option is to con-
tact a less attractive agent the less attractive agent has even worse options except
for reciprocating. This makes reciprocation a best response for the less attractive
agent. We summarize the result in Proposition B.3.
9We provide a more rigorous proof of this result in the Appendix.
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Proposition 3.2. (Reciprocity) In equilibrium if a more attractive agent contacts a less
attractive agent, the less attractive agent reciprocates with a contact. Formally, if Ai =
j < i in equilibrium then Aj = i.
Proof. See Appendix. 
3.3. Chasing and Sorting. For large p, contacts are highly successful so that when
high types contact each other, there is very little chance of high types being avail-
able to low types. This results in cliques of similar agents contacting each other,
and we label these phenomena “sorting equilibria.” Such equilibria are illustrated
in Figure 3 for the highest values of p. As p decreases, high types are more likely
free when low types’ contacts are evaluated so low types “deviate” from cliques
to chase high types. For sufficiently small p, all types except the highest chase the
highest type10, and we label this a “chasing equilibrium”. Again such equilibria
are illustrated in Figure 3 for the lowest values of p. We capture these qualitative
aspects of large and small p cases with Proposition B.4.11
Proposition 3.3. Define the “2-person clique” function ρ by
ρ(i) =
{
i+ 1, i odd
i− 1, i even
Assume N is even. Then ∃c, s > 0 such that in any equilibrium
(1) All equilibria are “chasing equilibria” if p ∈ (0, c), formally Ai = N ∀i < N .
(2) All equilibria are “sorting equilibria” if p ∈ (1− s, 1), formally Ai = ρ(i).
Proof. See Appendix.

An explicit example relating “chasing” and “sorting” equilibrium to the Tragedy
of the Sexual Commonsmay be found in the Appendix.
4. DATA DESCRIPTION
We wish to explain outcomes in the sexual marketplace as a result of rational
self-interested individuals in the pursuit of sexual relationships. This necessitates
a classification of individual characteristics that, through some sort of mechanism,
has an explanatory effect on relationship outcomes. Following literature that spe-
cializes in MSM behavior, the primary characteristic we focus on is physical at-
tractiveness which has been shown to have significant behavioral implications
(Sergios and Cody, 1986).
We use data from sexually active MSM surveyed in the 1997 Chicago Health
and Social Life Survey (CHSLS) using a suitably defined subpopulation of sexually
active MSM12. The study is available online and contains a wealth of variables
including number and characteristics of partners, satisfaction in the relationship,
and individual demographics. We acknowledge that survey data is inherently
10This also occurs if the highest type has a sufficiently large θ for any fixed p.
11
We assumeN is even for brevity. A similar statement is true forN odd.
12Details of our restrictions can be found in the Supplemental Appendix.
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flawed due to the nature of self-reporting, but it is the best option since we don’t
have data regarding sexual behavior which is recorded by an impartial observer.
In this sectionwe describe the characteristics of our population, define ourmain
variables of interest, and discuss the properties of those variables.
4.1. Population Characteristics. Our sample consists of 55 MSM aged 22 to 54
who were interviewed in the Chicago area. The median individual was white,
33 years old, had a median income of $30,000-40,000 and a terminal bachelor’s
degree. Of more direct interest, the median individual had 4-5 sexual partners
over the year preceding the survey (a variable we label parti) agreed that “sex is
very important to me” and thought about sex several times per day13.
4.2. Primary data definitions. In order to model matching behavior, we need to
answer the question: “Who is matching with who, and how successfully?” In this
paper “who” means what level of physical attractiveness one possesses. “How
successfully” means “was a match good enough to match again with the same
person,” in other words one’s relationship status with a person of given physical
attractiveness.
Physical Appearance. The CHSLS data set asks each subject to rate himself as well
as his last two partners on physical attractiveness relative to their age. In keep-
ing with thinking of physical attractiveness as an agent’s “type,” we label these
variables as θ0i for subject type and θ
1
i for each subject’s most recent partner, re-
spectively. Note that the index i refers to each subject in the population. Physical
attractiveness is on a scale of 1 to 7. Casual examination of the CHSLS data indi-
cates that more attractive individuals are overrepresented as sexual partners. A
simple T-test shows that the mean partner appearance is greater than the subject
appearance (at the 95% level). This suggests that the number of partners an in-
dividual has as well as his “quantity of sex consumed” should increase with the
attractiveness of individual. This is due to greater representation of more versus
less attractive partners in that individual’s pool of partners, as well as his greater
representation in others’ pool of partners. If this is the case, we cannot use models
which imply a constant percentage of single individuals across type, for instance,
Shimer and Smith’s (2000) search model which would be a clear candidate for this
type of work (Shimer and Smith, 2000). We provide a formal settingwhich predicts
what we casually observe and the data illustrates: People with different levels of
attractiveness consume different quantities and qualities of sex.
Since physical appearance is defined as type in our model, our results depend
upon how we map reported physical appearance to the utilities of players in our
game. Each game outcome is invariant to scaling all the types by a constant. There-
fore, we need only be concerned with the relative rankings we assign to physical
appearance. We have taken a natural approach, which is to assign each θ0i the av-
erage percentile score they represent in the sample. This is a useful metric to use
for comparability across studies or in combining datasets since it “automatically”
makes attractiveness scores comparable if samples are random. We summarize
this assignment of numerical values to physical attractiveness in Table 1.
13We thank a female reviewer for pointing out that this “sounds normal for any guy.”
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TABLE 1. Conversion of Physical Attractiveness to Model Type.
Physical Attractiveness % in Sample Model Type Value
4 20.4 −→ θ1 .102
5 50.0 −→ θ2 .454
6 24.1 −→ θ3 .824
7 5.6 −→ θ4 .972
Relationship Status. We investigate the premise that all individuals are involved
in sexual relationships with the same frequency. Assume that at a given time the
probability of someone being in a relationship is equal to q for all individuals so
that whether someone is in a relationship is a Bernoulli random variable with pa-
rameter q. The alternative is that for some pair of physical attractiveness types θ
and θ′, we have qθ 6= qθ′ . We have also constructed the variables SINGLE1i and
SINGLE2i, which capture current relationship status up to each subject’s twomost
recent partners. SINGLE1i is equal to one if the subject did not expect to have sex
again with his most recent partner. SINGLE2i is equal to one if the subject did
not expect to have sex again with either of his two most recent partners14. We
summarize the relationship rates in Table 215.
TABLE 2. Relationship Frequency and Looks.
SINGLE1i
Looks (θ0) Obs % Single (qθ0) 95% Binomial CI
4 11 82% [48%,98%]
5 27 26% [11%,46%]
6 13 23% [5%,54%]
7 3 0% [0%,63%] (1-tailed)
SINGLE2i
Looks (θ0) Obs % Single (qθ0) 95% Binomial CI
4 11 73% [39%,94%]
5 27 19% [6.3%,38%]
6 13 15% [1.9%,45%]
7 3 0% [0%,63%] (1-tailed)
We conclude that less physically attractive individuals are more often single
under both measures of “singledom” and have substantively higher rates of be-
ing single than more physically attractive individuals. As one would expect, it
appears that better looking individuals are more often in an active sexual relation-
ship. It is therefore desirable that any model describing the sex market should
imply higher rates of sexual relationships for more attractive individuals. Our
model does in fact satisfy this criterion.
14The first variable of choice to indicate relationship status for Male-Female couples, namely marriage,
is not applicable to this subpopulation which is in general barred from legally recognized marriage.
The question as to what effects the difference in legal institutions available to Male-Female and same
sex couples have on relationship outcomes is interesting, but one we do not tackle here.
15Unsurprisingly, the unique individual with θ0i = 3 which we have left out of the analysis was single
under both definitions.
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For ease of reference, we summarize the data variables discussed in this section
in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Primary Variable Definitions.
Subject Types θ0i
Most Recent Partner Type θ1i
Second Most Recent Partner Type θ2i
Relationship Status (Most Recent) SINGLE1i
Relationship Status (Two Most Recent) SINGLE2i
4.3. Choice of Relevant Data Variables. The variables most relevant to testing
the model are θ0i , θ
1
i , and Single1i. We believe that using θ
1
i and Single1i best cap-
tures the idea of short term matching outcomes explained in the model. Expand-
ing the estimation to include θ2i and Single2i doubles the size of the sample, but
this specification would be most appropriately used in a model which accounts
for polyamory in a strategic setting, something beyond the scope of our present
model.
5. METHODOLOGY
Here we detail our current approach to fitting the model to data and describe
the relationship of parameter estimates to qualitative features of the model.
5.1. Choice of Estimation Parameter. The point of our model is to provide a qual-
itative explanation of how the sex market functions. The model predicts a range
of behavior depending on the “noise parameter” pwhich dictates the equilibrium
that obtains whenever any group of agents meets in the sex market. It is useful to
think of p as an “equilibrium parameter” which fits model equilibria to observed
data. By estimating p through the process detailed below, we provide a qualita-
tive picture of behavior within the context of the model. For estimation purposes,
we focus on the 4 agent version of the model. In this case, it turns out for any
4 fixed agents there are at most 4 equilibria that occur as p ranges over (0, 1)16.
Given agents with types {θi} indexed from low to high, we number these 4 equi-
libria from I − IV and depict them below, where the indexes i represent the agent
with type θi and an edge directed from i to j indicates i has an optimal strategy in
contacting agent j.
Explicit calculation yields the values of p which generate each of the I-IV equi-
libria as summarized in Table 4. For some draws of Θj the II and III equilibria do
not occur, which is precisely when the corresponding sets for the II and III equilib-
ria in Table 4 are empty. For instance if θ1 = θ2 < θ3 = θ4 we see that Equilibrium
III can never exisCalculations using Table 4 will show that as p increases in the 4
person game, we move through equilibria in the order
I −→ II −→ III −→ IV
16The number of equilibria ranges from 2 to 4 in the 4 agent case. For larger numbers of agents,
the number of equilibria grows quite quickly which complicates the qualitative interpretation of any
particular equilibrium.
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FIGURE 4. Characterization of Equilibria.
TABLE 4. Location of equilibria.
Equilibrium (1− p)2 contained in:
I ( θ2θ4 , 1)
⋂
( θ
2
3
θ24
, 1)
II ( θ1θ4 , 1)
⋂
( θ
2
2
θ23
, 1)
⋂
(0, θ
2
3
θ24
)
III ( θ1θ4 , 1)
⋂
(0, θ2θ4 )
⋂
(0, θ
2
2
θ23
)
IV (0, θ1θ4 )
After any particular draw Θj , knowing p determines the equilibrium in the
game. Notice that the highest (θ4) type and second highest (θ3) type always con-
tact one another, and that therefore the equilibrium outcome is a function of the
choices of the lowest and second lowest types (θ1, θ2). For the case θi = i we il-
lustrate the payoffs to Agents 1 and 2 across p in Figure 4. The Roman numerals
correspond to the outcome equilibria as numbered in Figure 5. Notice the thick
vertical line that occurs where Agent 2 changes strategies in equilibrium. This
abruptly alters Agent 1’s payoff structure due to a change in the structure of the
contact network.
We assume that the data represents the outcome of independently played games
consisting of random collections of agents Θj = {θji } where for each j, θi are
drawn with replacement from the empirical distribution of subjects. By estimat-
ing pwe arrive at a behavioral prediction for any particular agentsΘj whomeet to
play the game17. We are looking for the p that across all random draws of agents
from the empirical population best fits some statistic of interest. We attempt to
capture what different values of p mean for (hypothetical) equilibrium outcomes
pictorially in Figure 6.
5.2. Estimation Procedure. We now need to specify some observable prediction
of themodel with which to estimate p. In this section we first convert the equilibria
outcomes into a matrix form. Second, we reduce the matrix form to something
17The explicit details of when and where each equilibrium occurs for a particular Θj draw in the 4
person game may be found in Appendix III.
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FIGURE 5. Agents’ Optimal Choices and Equilibria.
(a) (b)
FIGURE 6. Location of Equilibria Over the Population.
which can be reasonably estimated given the size of our dataset and provide an
explicit estimation procedure for p.
5.3. Observable Predictions. In estimating p, we need to match theoretical pre-
dictions from themodel with observed data. Given p and a given set ofN agentsΘ
we assume the agents play the game specified in the model with agents types inΘ.
We also assume that the game’s outcome is the unique (up to some tie-breaking)
RE equilibrium. As detailed above, for any fixed p this results in a matrix M of
predicted match frequencies.
Since all we observe are actual match outcomes across types, we are interested
inwhat outcomes themodel predicts for each type. Necessarily we need to convert
the “one-shot” model predictions for each subset of N agents into what should be
observed when different collections of N agents play the game. We take the fol-
lowing semi-parametric approach, which assumes that the observed distribution
of types is a good representation of the true population:
Let T denote the population of types observed in the sample (how such types
are determined is detailed below). We will denote by |T | the number of unique
types in the population and label each different one by ti. Let g(θ) denote the
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empirical distribution of subject types in T and define the probability of some N
agents Θ playing the game together as
f(Θ) =
N∏
θi∈Θ
g(θi)
Thus f is the distribution of N types randomly drawn from the sample with re-
placement. For each fixed Θand p create the matrix of equilibrium match frequen-
ciesM(Θ, p).
Now take M(Θ, p) and create the “match frequency matrix for all types in T”,
which we will call M(Θj , p). Specifically, this is a |T | × |T | matrix containing
the average probability of an agent of type ti matching with type tj in its ith, jjth
spot.18 Now take the expectation of M(Θj , p) over f to arrive at the “expected
match frequency matrix”
M˜(p) ≡
∑
Θj
M(Θj , p)f(Θj)
Assuming that the model is correct and p is the correct equilibrium parameter, we
would expect to observe the frequencies of matches across agents in the popula-
tion as given by M˜(p).19 In general, we suggest using M˜(p) to test implications of
the model although we reduce M˜(p) to a simpler form below.
5.4. Reductions. We will restrict ourselves to the case of N = 4 agents selected
from the population playing the game at once. In principle, given observations
regarding physical attractiveness of subjects and partners, as well as information
regarding the success rates of such matches we may estimate p through M˜(p) .
This of course requires distributional assumptions on the underlying data, and
for estimation involving M˜(p) in entirety requires a dataset much larger than our
own20. However, as we are actually only estimating one parameter, we may re-
duce M˜(p) to a lower dimensional form for estimation. The reduction we choose
maps M˜(p) to the expected number of matches we should observe over the popu-
lation, which we add has a nice interpretation as an efficiency measure (Aggregate
Matches) which is discussed in the appendix. The reduced measure is AM(p):
AM(p) ≡
∑
Θj
[
1
4
1>M(Θj , p)1]f(Θj) = 141
>M˜(p)1
The 14 comes from the fact that in each game, 4 agents are playing. Division by 4
gives the expected chance of a match resulting from drawing a player from each
game instance at random.
Define µi to be the Bernoulli parameter indicating the true rate of successful
matches for type i. We are interested in the random variable, say Z, which is equal
to 1 if a randomly drawn member of the empirical population has been matched
18We omit the notation for the conversion which is very unwieldy.
19We add that M˜(p) has no “reasonable” closed form, and accordingly the function is handled by
computer simulation in this paper.
20M˜(p) is a 4× 4 symmetric matrix and so has 10 elements to be estimated.
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and is 0 otherwise. Z is then distributed Bernoulli
Z ∼
{
1,
∑
i µig(θi)
0,
∑
i(1− µi)g(θi)
Accordingly, let
µ ≡ E[Z] =
∑
i
µig(θi)
Assuming the model is correct and that p0 is the correct equilibrium parameter,
we then have that the aggregate expected rate of matches over the population for
any particular µ0 is
Expected Matches: µ0 = AM(p0)
This leads us to the natural hypothesis test for any value of p0, which we will use
for estimation and confidence intervals:
H0 : p = p0, H1 : p 6= p0
In fact, our approach will be indirect in that we may perform the much easier
hypothesis test for any µ0:
H ′0 : µ = µ0, H
′
1 : µ 6= µ0
and convert the results to the corresponding p statistics using AM−1(p).
6. RESULTS
In this section we report our estimates, with emphasis on their interpretation in
answering our two main questions.21
6.1. Estimation of p. Using the process outlined in the Methodology Section we
label our estimates of µ and p as µˆ and pˆ, respectively. We estimate µˆ using an exact
binomial test in the standard fashion. This implicitly involves estimating AM(p)
using the population data so that AM(p) is in fact a (nonparametric) random vari-
able. However, as we take the subject population of looks as the true population,
we simply write AM(p) with the fact that it is a function of the data understood
implicitly. Inverting AM(p) to the appropriate confidence set then yields the esti-
mates shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5. Estimates of µˆ and pˆ.
Parameter Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
µˆ = AM(pˆ) .648 [.506, .773]
pˆ .462 [.348, .575]
21We note that due to a recently caught error in data entry, the reported results are slightly off (all
conclusions are essentially the same). Since we are considering a change to our estimation procedure
this has not been updated.
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6.2. Interpretation. By definition, µˆ is the aggregate rate of matching for a ran-
domly selected member of the population. More importantly, we want to under-
stand what pˆ says about behavior in the sex market. Our model implies that for
small p, the sex market is very close to a “chasing equilibrium” and for large p,
the sex market is highly assortative. We have estimated a rather midrange p, and
even the ends of the confidence interval are fairly far from the extreme cases in the
model as illustrated in Figure 7.
FIGURE 7. pˆ Estimate and Confidence Interval.
Recall that pˆ dictates which equilibria are chosen in the sex market. Since pˆ
is an estimate, we are also interested in what the model says over the range of
the confidence interval surrounding pˆ. For that purpose, we label the lower and
upper confidence bounds for pˆ as p and p respectively and examine what occurs
at each value of p ∈ {p, pˆ, p}. The complete picture of how individuals behave in
the sex market is given by who they contact given that they interact with a draw
Θ = (t1, t2, t3, t4) of types from the population. We summarize each case in Table
6.
TABLE 6. Equilibria Across the Population at pˆ.
Equilibrium I Equilibrium II Equilibrium III Equilibrium IV
Θ Draws: Θ Draws: Θ Draws: Θ Draws: Θ Draws:
(1, 1, 1, 2)2 (1, 1, 2, 2)2 (1, 2, 2, 2)2 (2, 2, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4, 4)1
(1, 1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3, 3) (1, 2, 2, 3)1 (2, 2, 2, 4)1 (2, 4, 4, 4)1
(1, 1, 1, 4) (1, 1, 3, 4) (1, 2, 2, 4) (2, 2, 3, 3) (3, 3, 3, 4)
(1, 1, 2, 3)2 (1, 1, 4, 4) (1, 3, 3, 3) (2, 2, 3, 4)1 (1, 1, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 2, 4) (1, 2, 3, 3)2 (1, 3, 3, 4) (2, 2, 4, 4)1 (2, 2, 2, 2)
(1, 2, 3, 4)2 (1, 3, 4, 4) (2, 3, 3, 3) (3, 3, 3, 3)
(1, 2, 4, 4) (1, 4, 4, 4) (2, 3, 3, 4) (4, 4, 4, 4)
1 indicates that for p equal to the lower confidence bound p, the equilibrium is
closer to I .
2 indicates that for p equal to the upper confidence bound p, the equilibrium is
closer to IV .
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For our estimated value of pˆ, we see that whenever multiple “low type” agents,
or rather θ1 type agents play the game, it results in equilibrium I or II indicat-
ing something like a “chasing equilibrium” where low types take their chances
attempting to match with the highest types. As p increases, the equilibrium in any
game tends to move towards IV , p will generally result in equilibria closer to I
than under pˆ. Conversely, p results in equilibria closer to IV than pˆ. The specific
movements are captured with superscripts in Table 6. In general, we see that there
is a range of behavior across equilibria since pˆ is far from the extreme values of 0
and 1. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the market is perfectly assortative, nor
can we conclude that agents always chase the highest types. A more enlightening
approach to analyze what occurs in the sex market is to weight the equilibria by
their probability of occurrence. This results in Table 7.
TABLE 7. Distribution of Equilibria Around pˆ.
Equilibrium I Equilibrium II Equilibrium III Equilibrium IV
Pr(Eqm|p): .031 .05 .109 .81
Pr(Eqm|pˆ): .013 .044 .105 .834
Pr(Eqm|p): .004 .010 .046 .94
We see from Table 7 that at pˆ, the chasing equilibrium I occurs rarely, and that
approximately 83.4% of the time the game is in equilibrium IV , and therein per-
fectly assortative. It would be fair to say that at pˆ, the sexmarket is 83% assortative,
1% chasing and in intermediate cases the rest of the time. Similar interpretations
can be made for the confidence bounds p and p, and we see that at the 95% confi-
dence level, our estimate indicates that the sex market may be highly assortative
indeed, where in 94% of all instances of the game, agents pair off perfectly in equi-
librium IV .
7. DISCUSSION
Our predictions regarding behavior are stochastic in nature and reflect dynamic
behavior of multiple sequential partners over time. This differs in approach from
what would likely be considered the most seminal pieces regarding matching be-
havior, namely Gale and Shapley’s stable matching problems and Becker’s Theory
of Marriage(Gale and Shapley, 1962; Becker, 1973). In this section we highlight
some of the strengths of our new approach.
7.1. Resolving an Apparent Conflict. The model we have chosen for analysis
provides qualitative explanations of outcomes which fit with qualitative obser-
vations present in the literature. For example, Sergios and Cody (1986, pg. 72)
point out the following apparent contradiction: On the one hand, Lewin’s “level
of aspiration” hypothesis predicts that competition in the sex market implies that
“one’s realistic social choices should be less socially desirable than one’s fantasy
choices.”(Sergios and Cody, 1986) We will call this claim one. On the other hand,
Sergios and Cody also point out that Berscheid (1973) found that heterosexual in-
dividuals prefer social contact with those more attractive than themselves, and in
their own experimental work that physical attractiveness was the driving force
behind associational choice(Bersheid and Walster, 1973). Call this claim two. We
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provide amodel of the sexmarket in which competition actually results in individ-
uals pursuing those more attractive than themselves, although that comes at a cost
of remaining single. Therefore either statement one or two will be true, depending
on the benefits and costs involved.
The empirical results answer the fundamental question: “When do the benefits
and costs support statement one or statement two?” Statement one corresponds
to a “like matches with like” situation as in the “sorting” equilibrium IV of the
model. Similarly, statement two corresponds to all agents chasing the most attrac-
tive individuals as in equilibrium I . Table 7 tells us how often statement one or
two holds. We conclude that statement one is the more generally true statement in
regard to the mid-1990s MSM population in Chicago, or rather that the sex market
is ’83.4% assortative.’ Even allowing for the lower bound of our estimate, p, we
would certainly be more inclined to agree that statement one is the best descrip-
tion of the Chicago sex market. However, for other populations statement two
might hold more generally. One such likely population is MSM who self-select
themselves into the Internet sex market as described in the next section. When
does statement two hold within the population under consideration? Table 6 pro-
vides a heuristic: namely, when the sex market consists of a few very attractive
individuals and many less attractive ones22.
We add that this conflict cannot be resolved with a stable marriage problem ap-
proach, which has far too many equilibria for estimation. Nor could it be resolved
using Becker’s approach in the Theory of Marriage, which is a model of long term
selection and matching, certainly not salient features of the population under con-
sideration. The approach here yields a way to untangle some of the qualitative
statements found in the literature regarding sexual behavior and outcomes.
8. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
This paper is in many ways only a first step towards explaining dating and
sexual behavior in a formal framework using empirical data. We provide what we
think are two promising directions in order to take the next step. Finally, we add
closing remarks.
8.1. Further Empirical Work: The Generalized Model. In order to achieve better
estimation, we may generalize the above model to allow p to vary across types,
with values, say {pi}. Each pi can be simultaneously estimated using techniques
similar to those above. This presents little formal difficulty, but requires more
sophisticated simulation techniques and likely a larger dataset. One promising
avenue is to choose two values of p, say pH and pL for the highly attractive and
less attractive members of the population. Then one can estimate the model on a
heterosexual subpopulation that is likely to be involved in the sex market rather
than the “marriage market.” For instance, we suggest the single undergraduate
student population or users of a computer dating site.
8.2. Further Applied Work: Sex Markets and Epidemiology.
“Computerized dating can save a lot of guesswork - but so can a bikini.”
22This also hints at the presence of “differentiated sex markets,” e.g. the highly specialized clubs one
finds in Boystown, Chicago.
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- Ed Parrish
One reason we are interested in sex markets is that when different sex markets
are available, MSM as self-interested agents should choose to participate in mar-
kets which are to their greatest advantage. Therefore, different markets should
self-select individuals with different behavioral patterns. Knowing more about a
particular subpopulation, in particular its composition and risk factors for disease,
allows for more tailored and effective public health policy. Two such “differenti-
ated” sex markets are the Internet and offline markets. Papers using survey data
from various sources23 exhibit differences in the composition and risk factors in-
volved between these two markets(Benotsch, Kalichman, and Cage, 2002; Kim,
Kent, McFarland, and Klausner, 2001; Elford, Bolding, and Sherr, 2001). They
generally conclude that in the Internet market relative to the offline market, par-
ticipants:
(1) Are younger, but of a similar racial and educational background.
(2) Have more partners, who are more often casual.
(3) Engage in more high risk behavior, especially with regard to HIV.
(4) Are more likely to receive material benefits in return for sex.
Interestingly, each paper estimates the percentage of participants in the Internet
market to be around one third of the total MSM population. We expect that partic-
ipation in Internet sex markets has increased since the time the data for the above
work was collected.
Using themodel and estimation techniques outlined, given an appropriate dataset
one should be able to describe different equilibrium behavior in the two “sex mar-
ketplaces” as well as which individuals are attracted to each. Given the results,
one could design targeted interventions to those at high risk in the Internet sex
market.
8.3. Conclusion. The techniques presented in this paper provide a method to
evaluate qualitative claims regarding short term sexual behavior, as well as to ex-
amine the structure of the sexual marketplace. For our specific population, we
have presented an estimated decomposition of sexual behavior and outcomes,
providing a partial answer to the two basic questions asked in the introduction.
We find that in the sexual marketplace defined by MSM in mid-1990’s Chicago
that choice of partners is highly, though not perfectly, assortative. We have also
predicted conditions under which non-assortative outcomes occur, provided a
qualitative explanation of why they occur, and estimated the frequency of such
outcomes.
In the broader picture, we aim to help answer the classic economic question
framed in this context: “Howdowe fulfill desire with limited resources?” We hope
that this paper is a useful step in the direction of exposing the role of individual
rationality in what is often left as a matter of unthinking animal drive.
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APPENDIX A. THE TRAGEDY OF THE SEXUAL COMMONS
Casual observation supports the following story:
Picture a bar filled with agents of the same type who are happily contacting
each other and going home with one another. In walks a handsome, buff college
student who everyone takes notice of. The original agents abandon their earlier
plans of contacting each other and overwhelmingly decide to chase the college
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student, the end result being that many of the original agents go home alone and
frustrated.
In otherwords, the high premium attached to some individuals creates a “tragedy
of the sexual commons” where not only does individual behavior lead to an inef-
ficient group outcome, but better options may in fact decrease expected utility for
some agents.
Example. Better options can hurt low types.
Consider a market populated by N agents of which N2 are of type θL and
N
2
are of type θH > θL. We may construct similar examples for all p ∈ (0, 1) so we
arbitrarily choose p = 12 and since decisions are invariant to scaling types by a
constant we normalize θL to 1. It is not hard to show that as long as θH < 4 low
types all contact one another in any equilibrium, and that for θH > 4 every low
type contacts a high type in any equilibrium. The expected utility of a low type in
equilibrium, given θH is:
uL(θH) =
{
3
4 , θH < 4
θH
8 , θH > 4
So for low types, utility is constant until θH > 4 at which point a “frenzy of chas-
ing” occurs in which no low type will ever go home with another low type. Low
types will actually do better when θH ∈ (1, 4) than when θH ∈ (4, 6). In the lan-
guage above, as θH crosses 4, the game transitions (violently) from a “sorting”
equilibrium to a “chasing” equilibrium.
We add that this chasing comes to the benefit of high types, as illustrated by
their expected utility jump when θH crosses 4 and high types match with low
types as a “last resort”:
uH(θH) =
{
3
4θH , θH < 4
3
4θH +
1
8 , θH > 4
Finally, this example serves to show that equilibria (even RE equilibria) are not
always efficient from the perspective of a social planner who places equal weights
on all agent’s utility. Specifically, fix  > 0 and suppose that θH = 4 + . From
above, in equilibrium we have aggregate utility (AU) of
AU = 2 · θH
8
+ 2 · [ 3
4
θH +
1
8
] =
7
4
θH +
1
4
= 7
1
4
+
7
4

However, a social planner could dictate that agents of like type contact one another
in which case we have
AU ′ = 2 · 3
4
+ 2 · 3
4
θH = 7
1
2
+
6
4

which narrowly beats out AU for sufficiently small .
APPENDIX B. PROOFS
B.1. A Lemma Regarding Optimal Behavior. Explicit computation of U(Ai, µi)
is quite tedious and for the empirical results we resort to computational meth-
ods. However, we can say something about the nature of an agent’s decision rule.
Fix an agent i and beliefs µi and referring to the stages of evaluating successful
contacts in Algorithm 1, let Sij denote the event that agent i is matched before
the choice Aj is evaluated. In particular, when i ≥ j since Sij only involves the
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choices of agents with higher types than agent j, Sij is independent ofAj for j ≤ i.
Rewriting U(Ai, µi) as
U(Ai, µi) = Pr(Sii)E[U(Ai, µi)|Sii] + (1− Pr(Sii))E[U(Ai, µi)|Scii]
we see that the value of the first term on the RHS is independent of Aj for j ≤ i.
Since Pr(Scii) is also independent of Aj for j ≤ i, we see that
argmax
j 6=i
U(j, µi) = argmax
j 6=i
E[U(j, µi)|Scii]
E[U(j, µi)|Scii] can be stated in words as “agent i’s expected utility from contacting
j conditional on the fact that a higher type has not matchedwith him.” Calculating
this utility is simple since agent i’s utility from contacting j is zero unless i) his
contact is successful and ii) agent j is unmatchedwhich are events with probability
p and 1−Pr(Sji). When these two conditions hold agent i gets a payoff of u(θj) so
E[U(j, µi)|Sci ] = p(1− Pr(Sji))u(θj)
and we conclude that
argmax
j 6=i
U(j, µi) = argmax
j 6=i
(1− Pr(Sji))u(θj)
For future reference, we summarize this result in Proposition .
Proposition B.1. Fix beliefs {µk} and let Sij denote the event that agent i is matched
before the choice Aj is evaluated. Then
argmax
j 6=i
U(j, µi) = argmax
j 6=i
(1− Pr(Sji))u(θj)
B.2. Personal Standards.
Proposition B.2. (Personal Standards) Let A∗i be agent i’s optimal choice in equilibrium.
Then
A∗i ≥ i− 1
In other words, an agent will never contact an agent who is more than one “level of attrac-
tiveness” below his own.
Proof. Considering Proposition B.1, the result would follow if we could show that
Pr(Sji) = 0 whenever j < i. This is clearly true for i = N so that A∗N ≥ N − 1.
Now if A∗k ≥ k − 1 ∀k ≥ m, it follows that Pr(Sj,k−1) = 0 ∀j < k − 1 so that
A∗k ≥ k − 1 ∀k ≥ m implies A∗k ≥ k − 1 ∀k ≥ m− 1. By induction we conclude the
result. 
B.3. Reciprocity.
Proposition B.3. (Reciprocity) In equilibrium if a more attractive agent contacts a less
attractive agent, the less attractive agent reciprocates with a contact. Formally, if Ai =
j < i in equilibrium then Aj = i.
Proof. Suppose A∗i = j < i for some i and by the Personal Standards result we
know that A∗i = i− 1 and Pr(Si−1,i) = 0. From Proposition B.1 we know that
A∗i ∈ argmax
j 6=i
(1− Pr(Sji))u(θj)
so we conclude that (1−Pr(Si−1,i))u(θi−1) ≥ (1−Pr(Sji))u(θj) ∀j 6= i. Combin-
ing this with Pr(Si−1,i) = 0 and u(θi) ≥ u(θi−1)we have
u(θi) ≥ (1− Pr(Sji))u(θj) ∀j 6= i
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Since A∗i = i− 1, we know that Pr(Sji) = Pr(Sj,i−1) ∀j 6= i− 1 so
u(θi) ≥ (1− Pr(Sj,i−1))u(θj) ∀j 6= i, i− 1
and for the result we need to show that
(1− Pr(Si,i−1))u(θi) ≥ (1− Pr(Sj,i−1))u(θj) ∀j 6= i− 1
which would follow from above if we could show that Pr(Si,i−1) = 0. Let k0 ≡
max{k : A∗k = k−1}. By assumption such a k0 exists and clearlyPr(Sk0,k0−1) = 0
since by Personal Standards, A∗j > j − 1 ∀j > k0. By above, we conclude that
A∗k0−1 = k0. Now proceeding successively with kt defined by kt ≡ max{k > kt−1 :
A∗k = k − 1}we conclude the result.

B.4. Chasing and Sorting.
Proposition B.4. Define the “2-person clique” function ρ by
ρ(i) =
{
i+ 1, i odd
i− 1, i even
Assume N is even. Then ∃c, s > 0 such that in any equilibrium
(1) All equilibria are “chasing equilibria” if p ∈ (0, c), formally Ai = N ∀i < N .
(2) All equilibria are “sorting equilibria” if p ∈ (1− s, 1), formally Ai = ρ(i).
Proof. (Sketch) Claim 1: From Proposition B.1 we know that for each equilibrium
choice A∗i we have
A∗i ∈ argmax
j 6=i
(1− Pr(Sji))u(θj)
and we know that Pr(Sji) ↘ 0 as p ↘ 0. Consequently as p ↘ 0, maxj 6=i(1 −
Pr(Sji))u(θj) → maxj 6=i u(θj) and by assumption all θi are different and u is
strictly increasing so for sufficiently small p, A∗i = N ∀i < N which shows Claim
1.
Claim 2: We know that the conclusion holds for agentN since A∗N = N − 1 and
for agent N − 1 by an application of Reciprocity. Fix i = N − 2 and by Personal
Standards we also know that
A∗i ∈ arg max
j 6=i,j≥i−1
(1− Pr(Sji))u(θj)
and if j > i then Pr(Sji) ↗ 1 as p ↗ 1 so as p ↗ 1 we have that maxj 6=i,j≥i−1(1−
Pr(Sji))u(θj) → u(θi−1) since (1 − Pr(Sji))u(θj) → 0 ∀j > i. We conclude that
for a sufficiently large p > pi we have A∗i = i − 1 which implies A∗i−1 = i by
Reciprocity. Setting i = N − 2k for each k > 1 we obtain a new pN−2k s.t. ∀p ∈
(maxm≤k{pN−2m}, 1) we have A∗N−2k = N − 2k − 1 and A∗N−2k−1 = N − 2k. We
conclude that 1− s ≡ maxm{pN−2m} suffices for the result. 
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APPENDIX C. SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX: SPECIFIC MODEL EXAMPLE
FIGURE 8. Equilibria Across p in a four agent game.
In this Section we illustrate the all different types of equilibria which occur as
p varies as depicted in Figure 8. Types are assumed to be θi = i, utility is given
by u(x) = x and A∗i denotes agent i’s equilibrium choice. Throughout we will
ignore “ties” which allow for multiple equilibria at p ∈ { 12 , 13 , 14}, as in in Figure 8.
From the Personal Standards proposition, agent 4 has A∗4 = 3 for all p. From the
Reciprocity proposition, this implies agent 3 has A∗3 = 4 for all p. Now the only
choices left to determine are A∗2 and A∗1.
A∗2: Now the probabilities of agent 4 and 3 being unmatched when agent 2’s
contact is evaluated are the same, namely (1 − p)2. Therefore contacting agent 4
weakly dominates contacting agent 3. From Proposition B.1 we know that
argmax
j 6=2
U(j, µ2) = argmax
j 6=2
(1− Pr(Sj2))u(θj)
Now A∗2 = 4 iff
(1− p)2θ4 = (1− Pr(S42))u(θ4) > (1− Pr(S12))u(θ1) = θ1
iff p < 12 .
A∗1: Since agent 1’s optimal decision depends on Agent 2’s action, we break this
into two cases.
Case 1: p > 12 . Now A
∗
2 = 1 so by Reciprocity, we have A∗1 = 2.
Case 2: p < 12 . Now A
∗
2 = 4. Appealing to Proposition B.1 we have A∗1 = 4 iff
(1− p)3θ4 = (1− Pr(S41))u(θ4)
> max{(1− Pr(S31))u(θ3), (1− Pr(S21))u(θ2)}
= max{(1− p)2θ3, (1− p)θ2}
which holds iff p < 14 . Similarly, A
∗
1 = 3 iff p ∈ ( 14 , 13 ) and A∗1 = 2 iff p > 13 .
Put together these calculations generate the multiple equilibria displayed in
Figure 8.
APPENDIX D. DATA CONSIDERATIONS
Here we discuss additional issues relevant to the definition of the appropriate
sample not found above.
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TABLE 9. Incidence of Hepatitis B.
HB partner mean GP partner mean
13.4 14.1
(4.98) (4.86)
D.1. Sexually Transmitted Infections and Relationships. Several studies point
out that the sexual behavior of those with sexually transmitted infections (STI)
differs from that of the general population, likely due to risky or promiscuous be-
havior leading to higher rates of infection. To ensure that we are not grouping two
fundamentally different populations together, we examine the rates of relevant STI
found in the population. We summarize the percentages of STI in the population
in Table 8 for reference and discussion.
TABLE 8. STI Rates.
Curable STI Rates Incurable STI Rates
Chlamydia 5.5% Hepatitis B 18%
Gonorrhea 29% Herpes 7.3%
Syphilis 1.8% HIV 3.6%
Rates refer to whether an individual has ever been diagnosed with a particular
STI. As rates are self-reported they likely underestimate true rates of incidence,
although with the exception of gonorrhea, no individual was diagnosed twice for
any STI. Since curable STIs can be cheaply and effectively treated once diagnosed,
we do not believe the incidence of curable STIs are good grounds to separate indi-
viduals into different populations.
Hepatitis B is fairly prevalent in the population with a sufficient number of sub-
jects to evaluate whether the knowingly infected (HB) and general population
(GP) behave differently. A test for this is using parti to see if the number of sexual
partners over the course of the previous year is different across the two popula-
tions. Using a two-tailed t-test, we do not reject the hypothesis that the HB and
GP populations are the same in terms of sexual behavior at the 1% level.
Herpes and HIV. As we have very few observations of individual with reported
infection for these STIs, we remain agnostic about possible differences in behavior
and keep these subjects in the sample. The most important of the two is HIV
due to the fact that it is currently both incurable and fatal, which one might think
would lead to reduced sexual behavior or monogamy uncharacteristic of the rest
of the population. In fact, neither is the case, with both HIV positive individuals
reporting 15 partners over the course of the past year. This indicates both are active
participants of the sex market, and further supports leaving them in the sample.
D.2. Concurrent Partners. Several subjects were currently involved or had been
involved in two or more sexual relationships concurrently. In fact, 35% of the sam-
ple had sex with someone besides the current partner during the course of their
most recent relationship. In addition, 11% were involved in a sexual relationship
with someone besides their most recent partner when they first slept with their
most recent partner. We acknowledge these facts here as in this paper we do not
examine polyamorous characteristics or model strategic behavior which takes into
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account polyamorous behavior. However, polyamory certainly has bearing on the
questions we ask in this paper, and would be a productive avenue for further re-
search regarding epidemiological implications.
D.3. DataMinutiae. We are interested inMSMwho exclusively and actively have
sexual relationships with men. Accordingly we dropped all female subjects and
those answering anything but “Only Men” or “Mostly Men” to a question regard-
ing gender preference. Two remaining individuals were dropped who had exclu-
sively female partners. Another individual who answered “Don’t Know” to his
own attractiveness rating was dropped, as this is a primary variable of interest.
Finally, two individuals who had fewer than two partners in the last five years
were dropped.
Judgement Calls. As this is survey data, we dropped three other observations based
on population characteristics before analysis. We acknowledge them here specifi-
cally due to the subjective nature of removal. Two individuals who answered that
homosexual sex was “always wrong” to a sex attitude questionwere dropped both
for the content of the question and because they answered 1 on the attitude scale
from 1 to 4 with no 2’s recorded in the sample. Another individual who uniquely
reported himself as themost unattractive member of the population claimed about
10% of the most attractive sexual partners in the entire sample. In fact, unless the
sex market is perfectly assortative, the model predicts such behavior, but given
that there is only one individual reporting this level of attractiveness we have re-
moved him from the data.
Variable Construction. The variable for frequency of sex over the last year must be
reconstructed as pointed out in the data reference, using sex frequency for those
with only one partner found in P1OFTEN and otherwise using SEXFREQ. Un-
fortunately the underlying variables don’t exactly mesh but we construct sex fre-
quency as detailed in Table 10.
TABLE 10. Sex Frequency Construction.
P1OFTEN SEXFREQ
“Once a day or more” −→ 1+ times a day
“4 to 6 times a week” −→ 3-6 times a week
“1 to 3 times a week” −→ 1-2 times a week
“2 to 3 times a month” −→ 2-3 times a month
“About once a month” −→ 1 time a month or less
“Once or twice” −→ 1-2 times a year
(Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Ariely, 2005)
(Posner, 1992)
